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Editorial
The Role of Community Molecular Diagnostics
Laboratories in the H1N1 Pandemic
Ten weeks after the virus first appeared, the initial H1N1
influenza pandemic episode appears to be waning in the
United States. Everyone involved is breathing a bit more
easily knowing that this novel virus is not as virulent as we
had originally feared. This episode tested our prepared-
ness for a more virulent outbreak, which has been the
subject of numerous planning meetings since the arrival
of SARS and Avian Flu several years ago. It is now time to
ask the hard questions: How prepared were we? Was our
public health response adequate? Was our clinical re-
sponse appropriate?
This H1N1 pandemic episode has particular signifi-
cance for those of us who work in molecular diagnostics
laboratories, as it is the first pandemic in the age of
molecular diagnostics. To be sure, the traditional meth-
ods of the virology laboratory are still important, but now
the primary focus is on the viral sequence, including the
evolution of the virus, its identification, screening tests,
diagnosis, and even drug resistance when it emerges.
This episode is ours.
So how have molecular diagnostics laboratories per-
formed during this pandemic? Very well, we believe. In
the Chicago area, during the first 4 weeks of the pan-
demic, 62% of nearly 8000 patients were first screened
for H1N1 by community molecular diagnostics laborato-
ries (both academic and non-academic labs, not affili-
ated with public health laboratories). Indeed, more than
half of the total cases of H1N1 (or probable H1N1) in
Illinois were first diagnosed in community molecular di-
agnostics laboratories. It is reasonable to ask how this
came about. What elements were in place that made this
rapid, effective laboratory response possible? We can
point to several key factors without which this kind of
response could not have occurred.
First, we need to acknowledge that there exists in this
country a large network of well-developed molecular di-
agnostics laboratories. Some of these are located in ac-
ademic centers, but others are in the community hospital
setting. Characteristically, these laboratories are staffed
by directors and personnel trained in molecular diagnos-
tics with expertise in the development and validation of
clinical tests. This rich resource, the foundation of mod-
ern molecular medicine, is generally undervalued, unap-
preciated, and, as evidenced in this most recent public
health emergency, underutilized.
The 2009 College of American Pathologists Survey for
molecular testing for influenza boasts an enrollment of
more than 100 laboratories, a 50% increase over the
2008 enrollment. This is a reasonable benchmark for the
number of laboratories capable of routine molecular test-
ing for influenza. An informal survey of Association for
Molecular Pathology member laboratories during the first
week of the H1N1 episode showed that 93% of the 43
respondents had a molecular assay that could detect
and distinguish influenza type A from type B. Those lab-
oratories had an aggregate test capacity of 3000 to 4000
specimens per day, and could expand their capacity to
as much as 12,000 specimens per day within 30 days if
needed. Thirty-six percent of the laboratories reported
having the capability of distinguishing the novel H1N1
strain from seasonal H1 strains. During the first week of
the outbreak, those laboratories had an aggregate test
capacity approaching 2500 specimens per day, with a
potential for expanding within 30 days, handling nearly
8000 specimens daily. Even with a disease incidence as
low as 5%, this test capacity could have easily accom-
modated all of the testing that identified the nearly 28,000
infected patients in the United States that the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention has documented at this
time. This is only a fraction of our true test capacity.
It is important to note that reports from these laborato-
ries are largely available within 24 hours of specimen
collection, a degree of timeliness not likely to be matched
by any public health laboratory. There can be no argu-
ment that accurate, timely data are crucial for making
public health decisions in the first hours and days of an
emerging pandemic. By the end of the first week of the
H1N1 episode, our own laboratory had identified 39
cases of “probable H1N1 infection” (our laboratory ini-
tially reported cases of influenza A, not seasonal H1 or
H3, as “probable H1N1, pending confirmation by the
public health laboratory”), only a fraction of which had
been corroborated by our state public health laboratory,
and confirmed only sometime after day 8. The Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention tally for all of Illinois at the
end of that week was still only three cases confirmed, a
number widely reported in the media, misinforming the
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public and the medical community of the true nature of
the pandemic.
The ability of clinical laboratories to respond as they
did was very much tied to their ability to develop and
validate their own assays, ie, laboratory-developed tests.
This ability to develop new analytical procedures in re-
sponse to clinical need is deeply rooted in the tradition of
the pathologist as the clinical scientist. This role, this
responsibility, is now shouldered primarily by us, molec-
ular pathologists and laboratory directors who bring mo-
lecular diagnostics to patient care. The Association for
Molecular Pathology survey respondents used more than
five different commercial assays, both analyte-specific
reagent and in vitro diagnostic tests, in their laboratories,
and 18% had noncommercial laboratory-developed tests
in use. Whether or not they were cleared by the US Food
and Drug Administration, none of these existing assays
had been approved for the detection of the novel virus.
Adaptation for this use could only be accomplished by
validation as a laboratory-developed test in the perform-
ing laboratory.
This rapid adaptation only occurred due to the avail-
ability of the H1N1 sequence data, which is as important
to the manufacturer of in vitro diagnostics as it is to the
developer of a laboratory-developed test. These data
need to be accessible, quickly and without limitation.
Analyte-specific reagent manufacturers, prone to invok-
ing proprietary restrictions when it comes to releasing
sequence information, need to provide sequence, con-
centration, and purity information for their products as a
matter of routine. In vitro diagnostics manufacturers, how-
ever, may encounter a dilemma in providing informa-
tion that could promote unauthorized use of their prod-
ucts. This problem could be readily addressed through
an Emergency Use Authorization as was issued by the
US Food and Drug Administration for the H1N1 confir-
matory assay developed by the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention; however, policies and mecha-
nisms to follow any such course of action need to be in
place beforehand.
None of these arguments should be construed as call-
ing for diminished standards with regard to laboratory
testing. Test validation, as always, needs to be rigorous
and thorough, but it need not be slow. Indeed, the vast
majority of molecular diagnostic tests for infectious
agents originate as clinical laboratory-developed tests in
response to clinical need, and it is exactly that nimble-
ness afforded the clinical laboratory that is called for
during a public health emergency. Leveraging that ca-
pability for the benefit of the public’s health, however,
does call for forethought and planning.
Communication and collaboration with local public
health laboratories are essential. The primary functions of
the community molecular diagnostics laboratory and the
public health laboratory are not the same. The former is
focused on rapid diagnosis for patient care, and in a
pandemic, for effective infection control and possible
allocation of limited resources. The public health labora-
tory necessarily takes a broader view to understand the
epidemiology of the pandemic, with an eye to formulating
public policy. Both activities are necessary, but they are
not independent. Understanding and coordinating their
different roles not only enhances their respective values,
but results in an efficiency that cannot be achieved oth-
erwise. Preparations are currently underway within the
public health laboratory network for the coming influenza
season, with projections that H1N1 will be a significant
player. This is an opportune time for the laboratory re-
sponse network to engage the community molecular di-
agnostics laboratories in a dialogue to develop cohesive
testing strategies. Our experience in the Chicago area
suggests that the impetus to do this will not likely come
from Washington or Atlanta but needs to start locally.
In the next pandemic, as in the next H1N1 wave to visit
this country, it is reasonable to expect that most infected
individuals will be diagnosed with a test performed in a
community molecular diagnostics laboratory. Appropri-
ate treatment decisions, effective infection control mea-
sures, and prudent use of antiviral agents, all demand
accurate and timely diagnoses and will drive the further
implementation of molecular assays. We believe that
community molecular diagnostics laboratories offer an
unprecedented resource to our public health pandemic
planning efforts and suggest that they be an integral part
of future strategic planning.
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